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LEGISLATING IN THE DARK: HOW CONGRESS
REGULATES TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS IN
IGNORANCE
John F. Coverdale *
I. INTRODUCTION
In responding to emergencies as it did recently in the Emer-
gency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008' and the American Re-
covery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,1 Congress necessarily acts
largely in the dark. In the midst of a crisis, time simply does not
permit gathering the desirable information, assuming that the in-
formation could actually be found. Unfortunately, however, Con-
gress's tendency to legislate in the dark is not restricted to emer-
gencies that require immediate action. This phenomenon is
particularly marked in the area of tax-exempt organizations.
This legislative tendency might be excused if the tax-exempt
sector were a minor sideshow. In fact, it is a large and vital part
of our economy and society. It produces more than eleven percent
of U.S. gross domestic product.3 One of every eleven paid em-
ployees in the United States is employed in the tax-exempt sector,
and almost six million people volunteer their services to tax-
exempt organizations. 4 Tax exempts play a particularly important
role in health care and education. Exempt hospitals constitute
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. J.D., University of Chicago;
Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison; M.A., University of Navarre (Spain); B.A., Late-
ran University (Italy). Special thanks to my colleague Charles Sullivan for helpful com-
ments and to Seton Hall University School of Law for summer research support.
1. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 37.
2. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.
3. Overview of the Tax Exempt Sector: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways &
Means, 109th Cong. 6, 14 (2005) (statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General,
United States Government Accountability Office).
4. Id. at 14-15. For comparison, food and lodging also account for nine percent of the
workforce, while manufacturing and retail each account for fourteen percent. Id. at 15.
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almost ninety percent of the entire hospital sector.5 Not-for-profit
institutions constitute almost sixty percent of all private four-
year colleges and universities in the United States.6 Without the
contributions of exempt organizations, both health care and high-
er education would literally collapse.
Proper regulation of the tax-exempt sector poses many difficult
questions. For example, there are important open issues about
executive compensation7 and, in the area of health care, the level
of charity care hospitals should be required to provide if they are
to be tax-exempt." In the area of education, questions have been
raised recently about the enormous endowments of certain elite
institutions. 9 Generally, there are serious questions about the un-
derlying rationale for tax-exempt status and the range of activi-
ties that should qualify.1°
From time to time, Congress commissions the Internal Reve-
nue Service ("IRS") to study a particular issue relating to exempt
organizations," and it generally holds hearings before enacting
specific legislation. 2 It lacks, however, a strong ongoing base of
information for legislation in this area.1 Congress ignores tax-
exempt organizations for long periods of time until a scandal
5. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Doctors & Dentists Account for 27 Percent of
$1.6 Trillion in Health Care Revenue (Dec. 13, 2007), available at http://www.census.gov/
Press-Release/www/releases/archives/health care insurance/011077.html (summarizing
data from 2006 Service Annual Survey: Health Care and Social Assistance).
6. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., INST. FOR EDUC. SCIS., DIGEST OF EDUC. STATISTICS
2007, tbl. 255 (2007), available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/
d07/tables/dt07_255.asp.
7. See, e.g., Jill S. Manny, Nonprofit Payments to Insiders and Outsiders: Is the Sky
the Limit?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 735, 735 (2007).
8. See, e.g., Jessica Berg, Population Health and Tax-Exempt Hospitals: Putting the
Community Back into the "Community Benefit" Standard, 43 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming
2010) (manuscript at 2), available at http://ssrn.comabstract=1243963.
9. See, e.g., Mark J. Cowan, Taxing and Regulating College and University Endow-
ment Income: The Literature's Perspective, 34 J.C. & U.L. 507, 508-09 (2008).
10. See, e.g., id. at 509.
11. See, e.g., I.R.S. HOSPITAL COMPLIANCE PROJECT FINAL REPORT (2009), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/frepthospproj.pdf (discussing IRS study of non-profit hos-
pitals in determining how non-profit hospitals establish and report executive compensa-
tion).
12. See generally U.S. Treasury, Fact Sheet on Writing & Enacting Tax Legislation,
http://www.treas.gov/education/fact-sheets/taxes/writing.shtml (explaining the process by
which Congress enacts legislation) (last visited Dec. 18, 2009).
13. See, e.g., Pablo Eisenberg, Looking Ahead: What is the Future for the Nonprofit
World?, 8 INT'L J. OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 81, 83 (2005).
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draws the attention of the press to a real or purported problem. 14
It then reacts to the public outcry, often without really knowing
the extent of the problem or whether the remedies it imposes will
solve or aggravate it.'1 This is due in large part to the fact that
the IRS, the agency charged with overseeing tax-exempt organi-
zations and providing Congress the information it needs for legis-
lation, has not been given sufficient resources to develop the ne-
cessary information and would be ill-suited to the task even if
properly funded.'6  This article illustrates this phenomenon
through a case study of the legislation on donor-advised funds
enacted as part of the Pension Protection Act of 2006.17
Donor-advised funds are charitable-giving vehicles widely used
by those who want to make a charitable contribution and receive
a tax deduction while waiting to decide how the contributed mon-
ey will be used.'8 They can support a wide range of charitable
causes ranging from scholarships to soup kitchens and from mu-
seums to clinics in low-income neighborhoods. They have existed
for more than seventy-five years, but Congress paid no attention
to them until articles appeared in the press alleging abuses at a
small number of donor-advised funds. 19
The resulting legislation contained in the Pension Protection
Act of 2006 restricts donor-advised funds in ways that Congress
hoped would prevent future abuses. 20 It is not at all clear that
abuses were sufficiently widespread or serious to justify the legis-
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-526, TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS:
IMPROVEMENTS POSSIBLE IN PUBLIC, IRS, AND STATE OVERSIGHT OF CHARITIES 20-21
(2002).
17. Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780, 1094-1102 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.).
18. See Jilian Mincer, Time to Convert? A Number of Philanthropists Are Shutting
Down Private Foundations and Turning to Donor-Advised Funds; Here's Why You
Should--and Shouldn't-Do It, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2009, at R8; see also I.R.C. §§ 170(a),
(f)(18), 4966(d)(2) (2006).
19. See Victoria B. Bjorklund, Charitable Giving to a Private Foundation: The Alter-
natives, the Supporting Organization, and the Donor-Advised Fund, 27 EXEMPT ORG. TAX
REV. 107, 114 (2000); Ashlea Ebeling, The Coming Charity Crackdown, FORBES, Aug. 15,
2005, at 67 (discussing abuses and upcoming potential legislation for donor-advised
funds).
20. See INDEP. SECTOR, ANALYSIS OF CHARITABLE REFORMS & INCENTIVES IN THE
"PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006" 1 (2007), available at http://www.independentsector.
org/programs/gr/Pension Bill Summary.pdf; see generally Pension Protection Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780.
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lation, which may discourage the creation of donor-advised funds
and makes it more difficult for them to continue to perform
worthwhile activities .21
Part II introduces donor-advised funds and briefly summarizes
their history. Part III examines the private and public advantag-
es of donor-advised funds, which could be lost through ill-advised
legislation or regulation. Part IV explores some of the ways in
which donor-advised funds can be and have been abused and
summarizes the reform proposals that preceded the Pension Pro-
tection Act of 2006. Part V sets forth the provisions of the Pension
Protection Act of 2006 that affect donor-advised funds and argues
that most of their weaknesses stem from the fact that Congress
lacked the information necessary to determine how extensive
abuses of donor-advised funds were and assess the potential posi-
tive or negative effects of the legislation. Part VI concludes that if
Congress is to regulate the tax-exempt sector intelligently, it
needs to appropriate more money for its oversight and regulation
and should consider creating a new entity to regulate it.
II. DONOR-ADVISED FUNDS22
Writing a check to a public charity like the Red Cross gives rise
to a current tax deduction, but once the contribution has been
made, the donor has no control over how the money will be used.2 3
Rather than contributing directly to a public charity, larger do-
nors sometimes establish private foundations which permit them
to retain a high degree of control over how their donations will be
used. 24 A private foundation is a legal entity with its own board of
directors that decides which charities will receive foundation
funds, how much they will get, and when. 25 By using a private
21. See INDEP. SECTOR, CHARITABLE REFORMS AND INCENTIVES IN SENATE VERSION OF
TAX RECONCILIATION BILL 1-2 (2006); Independent Sector, Background on Charitable In-
centive and Reform Provisions in Tax Legislation, http://www.independentsector.org/pro
grams/gr/charityreform-back.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2009).
22. I will use the term "donor-advised fund" only to refer to individual accounts. The
individual account often bears the name of the donor or donor's family. For clarity's sake, I
will refer to the charity that establishes the accounts as the sponsor.
23. See Pauley v. United States, 459 F.2d 624, 626-27 (9th Cir. 1972); Treas. Reg. §
1.170A-1 (a)-(b) (2009).
24. See generally LDS Philanthropies, Private Foundations, http://ldsphilanthropies.
org/planned-giving/ways-i-can-give/tools/private-foundation-l.html (last visited Dec. 18,
2009); see also I.R.C. § 509(a)(2)-(3), (f)(2) (2006).
25. See 1-16 PLANNING TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 16.01 (2009); see also I.R.C. §
[Vol. 44:809
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foundation, donors can obtain immediate tax deductions while
still retaining control over how and when their funds will be
used.2 6 Private foundations are, however, expensive to establish
and require considerable ongoing attention and expense. 27
Donor-advised funds offer donors many of the advantages of
private foundations at considerably lower cost in time and mon-
ey.28 They are sponsored and administered by independent public
charities.29 Donors contribute to the sponsoring charity not to
support its charitable activities but rather to establish a separate
fund or account from which distributions can be made to other
charities suggested by the donor.30
The money contributed to a donor-advised fund is usually not
distributed immediately2 1 The donor need not, however, wait for
the funds to be distributed to claim a charitable contribution de-
duction for tax purposes. 32 Because the assets immediately and
irrevocably become the property of the charity to which they are
contributed, the donor is entitled to a deduction when the contri-
bution is made.3 3 Donors to donor-advised funds do not have legal
control over the distribution of the funds they contribute, but in
practice they can have a high degree of confidence that the spon-
soring charity will respect their wishes.3 4 Donor-advised funds
509.
26. See Maroko & Landau, P.C., Why Establish a Private Foundation? (1999), http://
library.findlaw.com/1999/August/l/131037.html.
27. Thomas F. Horton, Effective Charitable Planning Strategies After the 2001 Tax
Act, 29 EST. PLAN. 580, 586 (2002).
28. See Bjorklund, supra note 19, at 108.
29. See I.R.C. § 4966(d)(1)-(2); Elfrena Foord, Philanthropy 101: Donor-Advised
Funds, 16 J. FIN. PLAN. 66, 66 (2003).
30. Foord, supra note 29.
31. See Sara Hansard, Concerns May Foil a Tax Break Eyed by Donor-Advised Funds,
INVESTMENT NEWS, Oct. 22, 2007, at 2, available at http://www.investmentnews.com
article/20071022/free/710220342.
32. See I.R.C. § 170(a)(1), (f)(18).
33. See id.
34. Most sponsoring organizations impose some restrictions beyond those imposed by
the Internal Revenue Code on all deductible charitable contributions. For instance, the
vast majority of sponsoring organizations will not make grants to foreign charities.
VICTORIA B. BJORKLUND, THE PROS AND CONS OF DONOR-ADVISED FUNDS AS ALTER-
NATIVES TO PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS app. at D-3 (2004), available at http://www.abanet.
orgtrppt/meetings-cle/joint2004/JointSectionPrograms/PhilanthropyinEstatePlanningfVict
oriaBjorklund.pdf. Certain sponsors require that all or part of the distributions from do-
nor-advised funds go to specific causes. See Foord, supra note 29, at 66, 72. The Domini
Global Giving Fund, for instance, allows donors to earmark money solely to benefit the
U.N. Foundation's programs. See Leah Kerkman, A Soaring Year, CHRON. OF
2010]
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thus combine immediate deductibility with on-going practical
control, without the expense in time and money required to estab-
lish and maintain a private foundation.
The first donor-advised fund was created by the New York
Community Trust in the early 1930s.3 5 For many years, communi-
ty foundations were the principal sponsors of donor-advised
funds.36 Little public attention was paid to donor-advised funds
until 1991, when Fidelity Investments created the Fidelity In-
vestments Charitable Gift Fund, the first commercially backed
sponsor of donor-advised funds. 7 The Charitable Gift Fund is an
independent public charity with the broad mission of "fur-
ther[ing] the American tradition of philanthropy by providing
programs that make charitable giving simple and effective.' '3 The
Charitable Gift Fund serves as a sponsor for donor-advised funds,
whose assets it invests primarily in Fidelity mutual funds.39 Oth-
er brokerage houses quickly saw that establishing charities that
would sponsor donor-advised funds was a way of attracting new
money to their mutual funds.4° Currently, donor-advised funds
are sponsored by community foundations, other public charities
(particularly universities and groups like the Jewish Communal
Foundation), and charities formed by brokerage houses and
banks .41
PHILANTHROPY, May 4, 2006, at 27.
It is rare for a donor-advised fund not to act upon advice that does not violate the Inter-
nal Revenue Code or its own internal funding guidelines, but there have been some cases.
For instance, the family of the donor of $300 million to the Searle Fund at the Chicago
Community Trust sued the Chicago Community Trust for failing to seek or honor the fam-
ily's advice. See Stephen Greene, Seeking Control in Court, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY,
Nov. 28, 2002, at 6.
35. Bjorklund, supra note 19, at 114.
36. See id.
37. Wendell R. Bird, How to Establish Donor-Advised Funds and Community Founda-
tions, 13 TAx'N EXEMPTS 68, 69 (2001).
38. Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund, Learn About the Gift Fund and Our Charitable
Mission, http://www.charitablegift.org/learn-about-charity/overview.shtml (last visited
Dec. 18, 2009).
39. See id.; Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund, Quarterly Pool Performance, http://www.
charitablegift.org/charity-giving-programs/daf/investments/performance/legalinformation.
shtml (last visited Dec. 18, 2009).
40. See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, Mutual Fund Giants Are Now Competing for Charitable
Donors, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2001, § 1, at 24.
41. See, e.g., id.
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Thanks in large part to the aggressive advertising of Fidelity
Investments and its commercial competitors, as well as the ef-
forts of community foundations to compete with them, donor-
advised funds have grown very rapidly.42 In 2005, 85 of the 125
largest community foundations reported that they held more than
21,000 donor-advised funds with total assets of $6.55 billion.43
They made grants of more than $1 billion.44 New gifts to donor-
advised funds at those community foundations totaled $1.36 bil-
lion in 2005. 45 The New York Community Trust alone held $700
million in more than 1,000 donor-advised funds ranging from
$5,000 to $99 million in size.46 Among commercially sponsored
funds, the Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund, the largest single spon-
sor of donor-advised funds, has almost 48,000 donor-advised
funds with combined assets of over $4.7 billion as of 2008. 47
Donor-advised funds are widely used by wealthy donors. Ac-
cording to one study published in 2006, sixteen percent of all high
net-worth households have established a donor-advised fund.4
The popularity of donor-advised funds increases with wealth. For
example, only 8.2% of households with wealth of $1 million to $5
million have donor-advised funds, but 23.1% of households whose
wealth exceeds $50 million (the highest category in the survey)
have donor-advised funds.49 Perhaps because donor-advised funds
involve some degree of ongoing involvement of the donor, wealthy
individuals who volunteer frequently are more likely to have do-
nor-advised funds than those who do not.50 More than twenty-five
percent of those who volunteer frequently have donor-advised
funds, whereas about sixteen percent of all other wealthy house-
holds have donor-advised funds.51
42. See id.; Letter from Steve Gunderson, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Council on Founds. to the I.R.S. 2 (Apr. 9, 2007) (on file with author).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Tax-Exempt Charitable Organizations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight
of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 110th Cong. 216, 216 (2007) (statement of New York
Community Trust).
47. FIDELITY CHARITABLE GIFT FUND, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2008).
48. THE CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT IND. UNIV., BANK OF AMERICA STUDY OF HIGH
NET-WORTH PHILANTHROPY, INITIAL REPORT 7 (2006).
49. THE CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT IND. UNIV., BANK OF AMERICA STUDY OF HIGH
NET-WORTH PHILANTHROPY, PORTRAITS OF DONORS 18 (2007).
50. Id. at 101.
51. Id.
20101
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III. ADVANTAGES OF DONOR-ADVISED FUNDS
A donor can choose between donating directly to a charity
which will use the funds for its own activities, establishing a pri-
vate foundation, or donating to a donor-advised fund. Donating
directly to a charity is the easiest and least expensive route, but
in doing so the donor gives up all future control. In contrast, es-
tablishing a private foundation gives the donor considerable con-
trol over how the funds will be used in the future.52 Donor-advised
funds are an intermediate solution, since they allow donors to re-
tain significant control over how their money will be used in the
future; donors of donor-advised funds, however, retain somewhat
less control than they otherwise would have over a private foun-
dation.53 From the point of view of the donor, the principal advan-
tage of donor-advised funds over private foundations is that es-
tablishing a private foundation requires formation of a not-for-
profit organization and obtaining IRS recognition of its exempt
status.4 The time, effort, and expense is often prohibitive for do-
nations of less than several million dollars. 55 By contrast, setting
up a donor-advised fund is simple and inexpensive or free. It
usually requires nothing more than filling out a short form and
writing a check to the sponsoring charity.56 Most sponsors of do-
nor-advised funds charge little or nothing to establish a donor-
advised fund.57
Once a private foundation has been established, it is necessary
to manage the investments, make grants, and comply with legal
requirements, including the annual filing of Form 990 PF.55 All of
this can involve considerable effort and expense. The operating
expenses of donor-advised funds are typically quite small, and the
donor need do nothing more than recommend contributions from
time to time.59
52. Bjorklund, supra note 19, at 108.
53. See id.
54. See Nina J. Crimm, A Case Study of a Private Foundation's Governance and Self-
Interested Fiduciaries Calls for Further Regulation, 50 EMORY L.J. 1093, 1150 (2001).
55. RON JORDAN & KATELYN L. QUYNN, INVEST IN CHARITY: A DONOR'S GUIDE TO
CHARITABLE GIVING 134 (2001).
56. See Foord, supra note 29, at 70.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 72 tbl.2.
59. See id. at 70.
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Another advantage of donor-advised funds is that their spon-
sors frequently have the expertise and staff to handle contribu-
tions of interests in real estate and businesses, which often are an
important element in large contributions. 0 Small charities and
private foundations usually lack the resources necessary to accept
such gifts.61
In addition to their obvious advantages for donors, donor-
advised funds have some advantages over private foundations
from a public policy point of view. A fund for which the donor has
advisory rights but is under the ultimate control of a public chari-
ty is arguably less open to abuse than a private foundation con-
trolled by a single family or business.6 2 The managers of the pub-
lic charity that sponsors the donor-advised fund will, in most
cases, be independent of the person who set up the donor-advised
funds, have responsibilities to people other than the donor, and
be aware of their personal liability.63 Public charity managers
have an interest in seeing that the activities of donor-advised
funds do not compromise the exempt status of the sponsor, who
will frequently be their employer.6 The managers of public chari-
ties also will often have an interest in fostering charitable inter-
ests in the community. 6 The fact that donors need to present rec-
ommendations to independent, unrelated directors of the
sponsoring charity may also lead to a certain degree of self-
regulation by donors.66 These factors taken together suggest that
donor-advised funds may well be less subject to abuse than pri-
vate foundations.
The public charities which sponsor donor-advised funds typical-
ly have professional staff, whereas according to one estimate, only
60. See Gunderson, supra note 42, at 4.
61. See id.
62. Letter from Timothy W. Townsend, Gen. Counsel, Nat'l Christian Charitable
Found., to the I.R.S. 12 (Mar. 26, 2007) (on file with author). For a discussion of the types
of abuses to which both are subject, see infra Part IV.
63. Letter from Reynolds T. Cafferata, Attorney, Rodriguez, Horii & Choi LLP, to the
I.R.S. 2 (Apr. 9, 2007) (on file with author).
64. See Townsend, supra note 62, at 12-13.
65. See id. at 4-5. It seems less likely that the executives of sponsoring charities es-
tablished by investment firms like Fidelity have any special commitment to advancing
charitable interests, but they do have an interest in maintaining the exempt status of
their organizations. Given the size of those organizations, no single donor or group of do-
nors is likely to represent a large enough percentage of the charity's assets to have much
influence over them.
66. Cafferata, supra note 63, at 2.
2010]
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five percent of all private foundations have any professional
staff.67 The presence of professional staff makes it easier to over-
see compliance with the law and to conduct due diligence on reci-
pients.6 8 The New York Community Trust, for instance, reviews
potential grantees to make sure that they have current financial
statements or audits, operate with independent boards, have
timely filed their Form 990, and have an adequate structure to
carry out the programs for which the grant is to be made.69 Spon-
soring community foundations which limit their operations to a
restricted area may also be in a position to conduct face-to-face
due diligence of potential grantees.7 0
For these reasons, in 2005 the IRS Advisory Council on Tax
Exempt and Government Entities advised encouraging greater
use of donor-advised funds rather than formation of small organi-
zations with free-standing tax exemptions.71 The head of the New
York Charities Bureau (part of the office of the state attorney
general) went even further and recommended banning private
foundations with less than $20 million in assets, observing that
"the donors to and managers of small private foundations, who
want to maintain their philanthropic commitment, would be able
to transfer assets to donor-advised funds in community founda-
tions and to other public charities, which are generally sufficient-
ly professional. '72
In evaluating existing legislation and in considering potential
reforms, the benefits that donor-advised funds bring with them
need to be kept in view because measures designed to curb poten-
tial abuses (which will be discussed in the next section) will al-
most invariably impose significant costs on legitimate entities
and may discourage potential donors from giving to charity.
67. Letter from Kim Wright-Violich, President, Schwab Charitable Fund, to the I.R.S.
(Apr. 5, 2007) (on file with author).
68. See id. at 3.
69. See Letter from Lorie A. Slutsky, President, N.Y. Cmty. Trust, to Robert Fonte-
nrose and Susan J. Kassell, Counsel, I.R.S. (Apr. 9, 2007) (on file with author).
70. See E-mail from Karen Krei, Executive Dir., Piedmont Cmty. Found., to the I.R.S.
1 (Apr. 6, 2007) (on file with author).
71. I.R.S., ADVISORY COMM. ON TAX EXEMPT & GOV'T ENTITIES, PUBL'N 4344, REPORT
OF RECOMMENDATIONS 17 (2005).
72. Grant Williams, Making Philanthropy Accountable, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY,
June 26, 2003, at 23.
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IV. POTENTIAL ABUSES OF DONOR-ADVISED FUNDS AND
REFORM PROPOSALS
Although there is no consensus over the justification for ex-
empting charities from taxation and for granting a deduction to
donors for contributions made to them, their tax-favored status is
ultimately rooted in the belief that charities confer important
public benefits on society. For this reason, to qualify as a charity,
an organization must be "organized and operated exclusively" for
certain charitable purposes listed in I.R.C. section 501(c)(3).73
A charity may not use its assets for the benefit of any person or
entity with a close connection to the organization, such as direc-
tors, officers, and key employees, whether by paying excessive
salaries, lending money at less than market rates, purchasing as-
sets for more than their fair market value, or in any of the myriad
other ways that unscrupulous insiders have invented to benefit
personally from connections to exempt organizations.74 In addi-
tion to this prohibition against benefits to insiders ("private in-
urement"), charities are also prohibited from using their assets to
benefit private individuals more than incidentally, even if those
individuals are not insiders ("private benefit"). 5 Like private in-
urement, private benefit can occur in many different ways, for
example, by paying excessive compensation, rent, or paying more
73. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
74. See id. ("[N]o part of the net earnings ... [may] inure[ ] to the benefit of any pri-
vate shareholder or individual."). In addition to obviously abusive transactions, unscru-
pulous individuals can use exempt organizations for transactions which do not violate any
legal rule but which may be inappropriate. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-
06-799, TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: COLLECTING MORE DATA ON DONOR-ADVISED FUNDS
AND SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS COULD HELP ADDRESS COMPLIANCE CHALLENGES 4
(2006). A loan at market rates to an insider who needs a loan quickly, for instance, is not a
prohibited transaction, but may not be the best way of investing the exempt organization's
funds. See id. at 4-5. Similarly, an exempt organization might purchase property from an
insider at fair market value that the insider needs to sell even though the exempt organi-
zation has no particular need for the property and could find other more suitable invest-
ments. See id. at 4.
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2), (d)(1)(ii) (2009); see I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). The prohibi-
tion against private benefit is rooted in the statutory requirement that charities be oper-
ated exclusively for certain specified purposes. See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 599-601 (2007). For benefits to be incidental, they must be neces-
sary concomitants of an activity that benefits the public at large. See id. Education, for
instance, necessarily benefits the specific individuals who are educated. Incidental bene-
fits must also be insubstantial when compared to the public benefit conferred by the activ-
ity. See id.
2010]
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than market prices for goods even though the recipient is not
technically an insider.
Congress has long believed that abuse of exempt organizations,
whether in the form of private inurement or private benefit, is
more likely to occur in organizations that are controlled by a few
people than in those organizations that are responsive to the pub-
lic at large. For this reason, since the early 1940s private founda-
tions, which receive their support from a small number of people,
have been subject to greater scrutiny and greater restrictions
than public charities.
The increased scrutiny began in 1944 with a requirement that
organizations that were not publicly supported charities file in-
formational returns not required of publically supported chari-
ties.16 In 1950 Congress imposed on private foundations an arm's-
length standard in transactions with insiders and prohibited un-
reasonable income accumulations, use of income for non-exempt
purposes, and investments that jeopardize the achievement of ex-
empt purposes.7 7 This legislation was ineffective, both because of
the difficulty of determining whether transactions met the arm's
length standard, and because the only penalty for violations-loss
of exempt status-was so severe that the IRS prosecuted only the
most egregious abuses .7 Even when it did prosecute, the severity
of the penalty made courts reluctant to impose it.7 9
The most important step in the process of imposing more oner-
ous requirements on private foundations was triggered by a 1965
report in which the Treasury identified six major problems re-
lated to them: (1) self-dealing; (2) undue delay between the time a
charitable contribution deduction was claimed and the time when
the public benefited; (3) involvement in business by foundations;
(4) use of foundations by families to control various property; (5)
financial transactions not justified by any charitable function;
and (6) involvement by donors in the management of founda-
tions." The Tax Reform Act of 1969 attempted to counter these
76. See Revenue Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-235, § 117(a), 58 Stat. 21, 36-37 (1944); J.
COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-29-05, HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT LAW OF THE
FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER TAX-EXEIPT ORGANIZATIONS 85-86
(2005).
77. Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, § 331, 64 Stat. 906, 957-59.
78. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 76, at 91.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 88.
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perceived abuses. It defined private foundations.8 1 It generally
forbade self-dealing, imposed a mandatory payout, limited per-
missible business holdings, prohibited jeopardizing investments,
and imposed restrictions on foundation expenditures including
grants to individuals and for any non-charitable purpose.
8 2
For the next thirty years, although private foundations were
subject to excise taxes for self-dealing, there was no sanction oth-
er than revocation of exempt status for public charities that en-
gaged in self-dealing. In 1996 Congress introduced "intermediate
sanctions"-excise taxes for acts of self-dealing by public charities
that confer "excess benefits" on "disqualified persons."8
Donor-advised funds are potentially subject to all the abuses
that could afflict both public charities and private foundations,
including private inurement, private benefit, undue delay in dis-
tributions, and being used as vehicles to maintain family or per-
sonal control over businesses or other assets.8 4 They share with
private foundations a significant degree of post-donation control
by donors, but the private foundation rules were not applicable to
them.8 Neither did the excise tax on excess benefit transactions
apply to them because those provisions regulate transactions
with "disqualified persons" but the definition of "disqualified per-
son" did not cover donors to donor-advised funds.8 6
Despite the potential for abuse of donor-advised funds, for
many years neither the government nor the public showed any
interest in regulating them. In the early years of this decade, a
81. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 509(a), 83 Stat. 496, 496-98 (codi-
fied as amended at I.R.C. § 509(a) (2006)).
82. Id. §§ 4941-45, 83 Stat. 499, 499-515 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 4941-45).
83. Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-68, § 1311(a), 110 Stat. 1452, 1475-77
(1996) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 4958).
84. See PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY
GOVERNANCE ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 39 (2005), available at
http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/Report/final/Panel-Final-Report.pdf. Donor-advised funds
could also be used to avoid the minimum disbursement rule for private foundations con-
tained in I.R.C. section 4942. The private foundation would make a contribution to a do-
nor-advised fund, thereby fulfilling its annual obligation to spend at least five percent of
its assets for charitable purposes. The donor-advised fund, in turn, would make a contri-
bution back to the private foundation. This abuse was known as "round-tripping." Id.; see
also I.R.C. § 4942(a), (d), (e).
85. See PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 84, at 39.
86. I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1) (2000). However, donor-advised funds and their donors are now
considered "disqualified persons" for purposes of the excise tax on excess benefit transac-
tions. I.R.C. §§ 4958(f)(7), 4966(d)(2)(A)(iii).
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number of factors converged to arouse public and governmental
interest. Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and the other great corporate
scandals pointed to the potential of abuse of large organizations
by powerful insiders. 87 Problems at United Way, the American
Red Cross, and the Nature Conservancy demonstrated that the
potential for abuse was not limited to the for-profit sector. 8 The
involvement of major investment houses and their aggressive ad-
vertising led both to the rapid growth of donor-advised funds and
to increased awareness of these previously little-known entities.89
A number of journalists began to investigate abuses in the non-
profit sector. The most significant effort was made by The Boston
Globe, which published a series of articles between October 9 and
December 29, 2003.90 Important articles also appeared in The
Washington Post.91 These articles do not, however, provide any
justification for the provisions of the Pension Protection Act of
2006 regarding donor-advised funds. None of the abuses brought
to light in the articles involved donor-advised funds. Further-
more, all of the abuses uncovered appear to involve clear viola-
tions of existing law and require better enforcement, not new leg-
islation.92 In an editorial published at the end of its series, The
87. See, e.g., America's Capital Markets: Maintaining Our Lead in the 21st Century:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov't Sponsored Enterprises of
the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 109th Cong. 1 (2006) (opening statement of Rep. Richard Bak-
er, Chairman, Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov't Sponsored Enterprises.); And-
rew Ross Sorkin, Ex-Tyco Officers Get 8 to 25 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2005, at Al.
88. See, e.g., Kathleen Day, Donating, with Cause; Now More Cautious, Some Are
Keeping Philanthropy Close to Home, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2006, at Fl; Jacqueline L.
Salmon, United Way Official Resigns, Alleges Inflated Numbers, WASH. POST., May 22,
2006, at B1; Stephanie Strom, Senator Questions Finances of United Way, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 22, 2002, at A20.
89. See J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 76, at 98-99.
90. Beth Healy et al., Charity Money Funding Perks, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 9, 2003, at
Al; Beth Healy, Foundations Veer Into Business, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 3, 2003, at Al; Beth
Healy et al., Foundations' Tax Returns Unchecked, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 29, 2003, at Al;
Beth Healy et al., Some Officers of Charities Steer Assets to Selves, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 9,
2003, at Al; Michael Rezendes & Sacha Pfeiffer, Underfunded IRS Unable to Monitor
Trusts, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 9, 2003, at A43.
91. See, e.g., Andrea Caumont, Giving Funds Provide Flexibility; Foundations, Circles
Redefine Ways to Donate to Charity, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2005, at F7; Andrea Caumont,
Reflect on Personal Interests to Find the Right Charity, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2004, at F8;
Albert B. Crenshaw, Tax Abuse Rampant in Nonprofits, IRS Says, WASH. POST, Apr. 5,
2005, at El.
92. See Sean Delany, Letter to the Editor, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 4, 2005, at
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Boston Globe called for more vigorous enforcement of both state
and federal laws, but did not suggest new legislation. 93
The first movement on the governmental front came from the
executive branch. In his final budget, President Clinton proposed
legislation to regulate donor-advised funds, but Congress did not
act upon the proposal.94 In other executive branch action, the IRS
mentioned the abuse of donor-advised funds in its "dirty dozen
tax scams" for 2005 and 2006, but offered no specific information
justifying including donor-advised funds in the list.9 5
In 2004 the Senate Finance Committee held hearings on tax-
exempt organizations. 96 The hearings produced some anecdotal
evidence of abuse of donor-advised funds, but no systematic or re-
liable information about them.97 Most of the abuses described
were violations of existing law. 9 Hearings before the House
Committee on Ways and Means in 2005 regarding the tax-exempt
sector produced no reliable information about donor-advised
funds.99 Virtually the only source of statistical information was
the annual surveys The Chronicle of Philanthropy had begun to
publish in 2000. The survey for 2005 showed that donor-advised
funds had become an important part of the not-for-profit sector.
93. See Editorial, Protecting Charity, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 30, 2003, at A14.
94. The Clinton administration proposed that any charity which had more than fifty
percent of its assets in donor-advised funds would be treated as a public charity only if
three conditions were met:
(1) there [was] no material restriction or condition that prevent[ed] the organ-
ization from freely and effectively employing the assets in such donor advised
funds, or the income therefrom, in furtherance of its exempt purposes; (2) dis-
tributions [were] made from such donor advised funds only as contributions
to public charities ... or governmental entities; and (3) annual distributions
from donor advised funds equaled] at least five percent of the net fair market
value of the organization's aggregate assets held in donor advised funds.
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR
2001 REVENUE PROPOSALS 106 (2000).
Failure to meet those requirements would not lead to loss of public charity status for
such a sponsor of donor-advised funds, but all assets maintained in donor-advised funds
would be subject to the private foundation rules and excise taxes. Id. at 106-07. Finally,
the administration proposed treating donors to donor-advised funds as disqualified per-
sons for purposes of the self-dealing and excess benefit rule. Id. at 107.
95. I.R.S. News Release IR-2006-25 (Feb. 7, 2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/
newsroom/article/O,,id=154293,00.html; I.R.S. News Release IR-2005-19 (Feb. 28, 2005),
available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/O,,id=136337,00.html.
96. See generally Charity Oversight and Reform: Keeping Bad Things from Happening
to Good Charities: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 108th Cong. (2004).
97. See id. at 37, 81, 200-03.
98. See Delany, supra note 92.
99. See generally Overview of the Tax-Exempt Sector, supra note 3.
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Respondents to the survey reported that they sponsored more
than 92,000 donor-advised funds, an increase of ten percent over
2004. °10 Total assets were $15.5 billion-up twenty-two percent
from the previous year.10 1 Collectively, the funds distributed $3.3
billion to charity, an increase of nearly twenty-one percent over
the previous year.102 The Chronicle survey understates the num-
ber of donor-advised funds and their assets since it reports only
the data from the sponsoring groups who responded, making no
attempt to extrapolate to the entire universe of donor-advised
funds. 103
A staff discussion draft issued by the Senate Finance Commit-
tee in June 2004 proposed a number of reforms. To deal with con-
cerns about the use of donor-advised funds to retain family con-
trol of businesses and other property, contributions other than
cash or publicly traded securities would have to be sold within
one year, and a plan for their sale would have to exist at the time
of the gift (alternatively, a donor-advised fund would be limited to
receiving only cash or publicly traded securities).' To lessen the
probability of abusive grants to insiders, a donor-advised fund
"would not be permitted to make grants to a non-operating pri-
vate foundation or to individuals."05 It would also "be required to
secure from the grantee an acknowledgment that the grant will
not convey a private benefit to the advising donor."06 To meet
concerns about "parking" of assets, donor-advised funds held by a
single sponsor "would be required to meet an aggregate annual
payout consisting solely of grants paid of [five] percent of the [do-
nor-advised fund]'s assets," and "individual accounts in a [donor-
advised fund] would have to meet a minimum activity thre-
100. THE CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, HOW THE CHRONICLE COMPILED ITS DONOR-
ADVISED FUND SURVEY (2006), http://www.philanthropy.com/premium/articles/vl8/il4/140
02901.html (on file with author). In 2006, the Chronicle sent questionnaires to the fifty
community foundations which raised the most money in 2005 and to all other organiza-
tions other than community foundations that it knew sponsored donor-advised funds; it
received responses from forty-one community foundations, eighteen commercial invest-
ment companies, and twenty-nine other groups such as universities and Jewish founda-
tions. Id.
101. Id.
102. Kerkman, supra note 34.
103. See THE CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, supra note 100.
104. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., 108TH CONG., TAX EXEMPT GOVERNANCE
PROPOSALS: STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT 1-2, available at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/
testimony/2004test/062204stfdis.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2009).
105. Id. at 2.
106. Id.
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shold."10 7 To facilitate regulation by the IRS, sponsors of donor-
advised funds would be required to disclose the existence of the
funds on their "Form 990 and show satisfaction of the payout and
all other requirements. " 108 Due to concerns about money reaching
terrorist organizations, grants by a donor-advised fund to non-
domestic organizations would be permitted only if the grantee
appears on an IRS list of approved foreign organizations. 10 9 Be-
cause of concerns about self-dealing, a donor-advised fund would
be required to hire investment managers utilizing arm's-length
principles."0 To limit potential abuses in the form of paying travel
expenses of donors and similar items, a donor-advised fund "gen-
erally would not be permitted to expend amounts for grantee se-
lection, such as site visits, that extend beyond basic due diligence
of grant approval."' Finally, to deal with concerns about exces-
sive finder's fees and similar items, the limitation of fees for re-
ferrals or transfers of funds to a donor-advised fund was pro-
posed. 1 2
At the request of the Senate Finance Committee, Independent
Sector, a coalition of charitable nonprofit organizations, philanth-
ropic foundations, and corporate giving programs convoked a
twenty-four member panel on the nonprofit sector." 3 The panel
issued an extensive report and accepted the substance of the
Finance Committee staffs recommendations (1) prohibiting
grants to non-operating foundations and individuals (though al-
lowing grants to individuals chosen by a committee independent
of the donor), (2) requiring an aggregate five percent minimum
payout rate and a minimum activity level in each individual fund,
and (3) requiring reporting of information about donor-advised
funds on sponsoring organizations' Form 990."4 The panel re-
jected the proposal to require donor-advised funds to sell within
one year all assets received other than cash or publicly traded se-
curities, or to limit contributions to cash or publicly traded securi-
ties.15 It also did not adopt the staffs recommendations (1) that
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. Id.
112. See id.
113. See PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 84.
114. Id. at 40-42.
115. See id. at 55.
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donor-advised funds be prohibited from contributing to foreign
groups other than those on a list of approved organizations, (2)
that investment managers be hired according to arm's-length
principles, or (3) that fees for referrals or transfers of funds be li-
mited.116 Although the panel also rejected the staffs proposal re-
garding expenses of grantee selection, it proposed prohibiting
substantial benefits to donors, advisers, and related parties in
connection with grant recommendations. 117
The panel went beyond the staffs proposals in several areas.
On the substantive level, it suggested prohibiting both compensa-
tion and reimbursement of expenses to donors, advisers, and re-
lated parties.11 8 On the formal level, it suggested requiring a
number of written statements (1) by the donor that the sponsor-
ing charity would have legal control over the contributed assets
and that the donor would not receive any substantial benefit; (2)
by the sponsoring charity, self-certifying that the donor would re-
ceive no substantial benefit; and (3) by grant recipients that the
grant would involve no substantial benefit to the donor, an advis-
er, any related party, or any person outside the charitable class. 19
Many of these measures were incorporated into the Tax Relief
Act of 2005, which was not enacted.120 This proposed legislation
required an aggregate five percent annual payout as well as mi-
nimal levels of activity in individual donor-advised funds.12' It al-
so included an account-level distribution requirement for ac-
counts that hold illiquid assets. 122 The bill treated donors, donor
advisers, and investment advisers to donor-advised funds as dis-
qualified persons with respect to the sponsoring organization. 23
As recommended by the panel on the nonprofit sector, it made the
entire amount of any distribution from a donor-advised fund to a
donor or donor adviser an excess benefit transaction subject to
excise tax.124 The bill prohibited distributions to individuals and
116. See id. at 40-41.
117. See id. at 43.
118. See id.
119. Id. at 44.
120. Tax Relief Act of 2005, S. 2020, 109th Cong. §§ 331-334 (2005).
121. Id. § 331.
122. Id.
123. Id. § 332.
124. Id. §§ 332-33.
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to all organizations not described in I.R.C. section 170(b)(1)(A). 12'
In addition, it imposed an excise tax whenever a donor or donor
adviser receives, directly or indirectly, a benefit as a result of a
distribution from a donor-advised fund.126 On the formal level, the
bill required sponsoring organizations to acknowledge in writing
that they have exclusive legal control over contributed assets. 127 It
also required them to report on their Form 990 the total number
of donor-advised funds they own, the aggregate value of assets
held in those funds, and the aggregate contributions to and
grants made from those funds during the year. 28 Although this
bill was not enacted, many of its provisions found their way into
the Pension Protection Act of 2006.
V. THE PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006
The Pension Protection Act of 2006 created for the first time a
statutory category of donor-advised funds and applied to them a
set of provisions intended to prevent abuses. 129 The provisions are
modeled in part on the rules applicable to private foundations
and on the intermediate sanction provisions, but in some cases
are harsher than even the private foundation rules.13
A donor-advised fund is defined as a fund or account (1) owned
and controlled by any organization (other than a governmental
entity or a private foundation) eligible to receive deductible con-
tributions (the "sponsoring organization"), (2) separately identi-
fied by reference to the donor, and (3) with respect to which the
donor has (or reasonably expects to have) advisory privileges re-
lating to the distribution or investment of the account because of
his status as donor.13 '
125. See id. at § 331.
126. See id.
127. Id. § 334.
128. Id.
129. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
130. Compare I.R.C. § 4966(a)-(d) (2006) (imposing an excise tax of twenty percent on
distributions from a donor-advised fund to an individual, with one exemption), with id. §
4945(a)-(d), (g) (allowing grants to individuals under more lenient circumstances).
131. Id. § 4966(d). A fund or account is not a donor-advised fund (1) if it makes grants
only to a single identified organization or governmental entity, (2) if the donor has advi-
sory privileges only as a member of a committee which awards grants for travel or study to
individuals on an objective and non-discriminatory basis, and (3) if he does not directly or
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Contributions to donor-advised funds are generally deductible
under the rules applicable to contributions to publicly supported
charities.3 2 Congress did not choose to limit contributions to cash
or publicly traded securities or to require that all other assets be
sold within a year. Rather, it dealt with the concern that donor-
advised funds might be used to retain control over closely-held
businesses by subjecting donor-advised funds to the excess busi-
ness holding rules applicable to private foundations.' 33 Under
these rules, donor-advised funds are not permitted to have an
ownership interest in a proprietorship, and the interests they
may hold in other businesses are limited.3 4
Application to donor-advised funds of the excess business hold-
ing rules lessens the risk of use of donor-advised funds to retain
family control over businesses while obtaining a tax deduction for
contributions of assets that may produce little current income
and little immediate benefit to charitable causes. On the other
hand, it makes unavailable to donor-advised funds potential
sources of large gifts, which might in some cases provide signifi-
cant support for charitable activities.
The Pension Protection Act of 2006 does not contain any provi-
sion regarding minimum aggregate payouts nor minimum levels
of activity of individual donor-advised funds.' 35 Apparently, in this
area Congress recognized that it did not have enough information
to make a decision. It limited itself to directing the Secretary of
indirectly control the committee. See id. § 4966(d)(2)(B). The Secretary of the Treasury has
authority to exempt a fund from being treated as donor-advised if it benefits a single iden-
tified charitable purpose or whose activities extend beyond awards or grants for travel or
study if the donor has advisory privileges only as a member of a committee which he does
not control. See id. § 4966(d)(2)(C).
132. A deduction may be claimed only if the donor receives a contemporaneous written
acknowledgement from the sponsoring organization that it has exclusive legal control over
the assets contributed. Id. § 170 (f)(18)(B). Contributions to donor-advised funds are not
deductible if the sponsoring organization is a non-functionally integrated Type III support-
ing organization, a veterans organization, a fraternal society, or a cemetery company. See
id. § 170 (f)(18)(A).
133. See id. § 4943(e).
134. Id. § 4943(c)(2), (3) (stating that generally, a donor-advised fund is permitted to
hold twenty percent of the voting stock of a corporation, of the profit interests in a part-
nership, or of the beneficial interests in other unincorporated enterprises, reduced by
amount of voting stock, profit interests, or beneficial interests held by a donor and donor
advisor or persons related to them).
135. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified as
amended in scattered section of 26 U.S.C.).
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the Treasury to conduct a study of the subject and to make rec-
ommendations to Congress.13
It is far from clear that there is any need for a mandatory ag-
gregate payout requirement. Starting with fiscal year 2008, the
information collected in Schedule D of the redesigned Form 990
permits the IRS and the Treasury to determine a payout rate for
each sponsor of donor-advised funds.' 37 Until that information be-
comes available, the meager existing evidence suggests that a
payout requirement in the range most frequently discussed (five
to six percent) would have little positive effect.13 The median
payout rate for donor-advised funds covered by The Chronicle of
Philanthropy's survey for 2005 was 17.5%, while only three spon-
sors failed to distribute at least five percent. 139 In view of the vo-
luntary character of the responses and of the survey's focus on
the largest and best-known sponsors, the data the survey pro-
vides cannot be considered representative of all donor-advised
funds, but it suggests that the impact of a five or six percent ag-
gregate payout requirement would be small.10
Payout rates for private foundations hover near the legally
mandated five percent, and it seems that many private founda-
tion managers view the legally imposed five percent payout as a
ceiling as well as a floor.'' If the donors to donor-advised funds
were to interpret an aggregate payout requirement in the same
manner, it is possible that a legally imposed aggregate payout
rate might lead to smaller rather than larger payouts overall.142
If there is a serious problem of insufficient payouts, it resides
primarily at the level of individual donor-advised funds. There
seems to be a consensus among fund sponsors that requiring a
minimum payout percentage from each individual fund would be
extremely burdensome from an administrative point of view.' 4 3
136. Id. § 1226, 120 Stat. 780, 1094.
137. See I.R.S., SCHEDULE D (FORM 990) SUPPLEMENTAL FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, OMB
NO. 1545-0047, Part 1 (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990sd.pdf.
138. See Kerkman, supra note 34.
139. Id.
140. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 74, at 16.
141. See Memorandum from Individual Members of the Am. Bar Ass'n, Section of Real
Prop., Probate and Trust Law, Charitable Planning and Orgs. Group to the I.R.S. (Apr. 9,
2007) (on file with author).
142. See id.
143. Id.
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Currently there is no factual basis for imposing such a require-
ment. There is no reliable information about payouts from indi-
vidual donor-advised funds,'- and even the revised Schedule 990
will not produce that information.145
A minimal level of activity requirement (say at least one grant
of some minimum amount every three years) would be less bur-
densome to administer than an annual percentage distribution
requirement. Many of the funds connected with investment hous-
es have such a requirement. 146 Their experience suggests, howev-
er, that it has little practical effect, since the vast majority of do-
nor-advised funds voluntarily meet or surpass the required
activity level.141 In view of the minor impact a minimum activity
requirement could be expected to have, it is not clear that the
benefits would outweigh the costs.
Three separate, codified provisions of the Pension Protection
Act of 2006 are designed to prevent the assets of donor-advised
funds from being used for the benefit of the donor or of persons
related to the donor or for any non-charitable purpose.
The first provision imposes an excise tax on taxable distribu-
tions from donor-advised funds. If a taxable distribution is made,
the sponsoring organization is subject to a tax equal to twenty
percent of the distribution, and any fund manager who knowingly
approved the distribution is subject to a tax equal to five percent
of the distribution, not to exceed $10,000.14 The new provision is
inspired by the tax on taxable expenditures of private founda-
tions, but is less sweeping.149
144. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 74, at 16-17.
145. I.R.S., supra note 137. Rather, the revised Schedule 990 will provide information
with regard to sponsors of donor-advised funds. Id.
146. See, e.g., FIDELITY CHARITABLE GIFr FUND, GIFT FUND POLICY GUIDELINES:
PROGRAM CIRCULAR 19 (2009), available at http://www.charitablegift.org/docs/Gift-Fund-
Policy-Guidelines.pdf. If a donor-advised fund does not distribute at least $250 during any
given seven-year period, the Gift Fund will attempt to contact the account holder and re-
quire one or more distributions totaling $250. Id. If the accountholder does not respond,
the Giving Fund will transfer the entire balance of the Giving Account to the Trustees'
Philanthropy Fund. Id.
147. See, e.g., Letter from David L. Giunta, Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund, to the I.R.S.
6-7 (Apr. 5, 2007) (on file with author) (according to Fidelity, less than 0.2% of the funds
in the Fidelity Investments Charitable Gift Fund are inactive under the standard set forth
in the preceding footnote).
148. I.R.C. § 4966(a)-(b) (2006).
149. See id. § 4945(a) (imposing excise tax on the taxable expenditures of private foun-
dations).
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Donor-advised funds generally incur a penalty tax if they make
grants to individuals.150 The only exception is for scholarships to
individuals for study or travel. 51 To qualify for the exception from
the penalty tax, scholarships must be granted on an "objective
and non-discriminatory basis," and the donor may participate in
the selection of the scholarship recipients only as a member of a
committee that the donor does not control. 152 These limitations on
grants to individuals constitute an easily administered bright-line
rule that prohibits certain grants that would violate the more-
difficult-to-apply rules against private inurement and private
benefit, such as scholarships awarded to the children of the do-
nor.
The prohibition, however, also sweeps in other grants to which
there is no serious objection from a policy point of view. For in-
stance, scholarships to individuals unrelated to the donor but in
which the donor plays a major role in selecting recipients are in-
cluded in the provision."53 In testimony before Congress in 2007, a
number of sponsoring organizations argued that the new rules
will be a serious obstacle to the operation of many small scholar-
ship funds that have functioned efficiently in t. e past thanks to
the direct involvement of the families or individuals that created
them.15 They also suggested that severely limiting donor in-
volvement in the selection of scholarship recipients may discou-
rage the creation of scholarship funds."' Even without the new
150. Id. § 4966(c)(1)(A).
151. See id. § 4966(d)(a)(B)(ii).
152. Id. § 4966(d)(2)(B)(ii).
153. See id. § 4966(c)(1). Donor involvement in the choice of scholarship recipients does
not seem in itself objectionable if it does not lead to favoring persons related in some way
to the donor.
154. Tax-Exempt Charitable Organizations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight
of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 110th Cong. 202-03 (2007) (letter of Nancy Tate, Pres-
ident, League of Women Voters of Arlington, Virginia); id. at 218 (statement of New York
Community Trust); id. at 224 (statement of Putnam Scholarship Fund); id. at 157 (state-
ment of Community Foundation of Western Massachusetts). The Community Foundation
of Western Massachusetts testified that it provides one thousand scholarships each year
from one hundred funds. Id. at 157. Under the Pension Protection Act of 2006, it classified
forty-one of the one hundred funds as donor-advised funds. Id. After what the foundation
described as extensive and costly negotiations with the donors, seventeen of the forty-one
opted out. Id. The foundation expressed its fear that "many, unfortunately, will never be
heard from again." Id. It also complained that "[tihe award process for the remaining
twenty-four went from being personalized, often family centered opportunities for pioneer-
ing community engagement to impersonal, assembly line selection forced marches dictated
by the tyranny of the majority selected by us." Id.
155. Id. at 218 (statement of New York Community Trust); see also id. at 224 (state-
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rule, grants to individual family members would be illegal. 156
There is no evidence that abusive grants were sufficiently wide-
spread to require a bright-line rule with its associated costs.
Grants to organizations are permitted without penalties if
made to the sponsoring organization of the donor-advised fund, to
another donor-advised fund, or to a "fifty-percent charity" (gener-
ally governmental units, churches, schools, hospitals, and other
publicly supported charities)., 57 Grants to other types of organiza-
tions are subject to penalty taxes unless the distribution is for
charitable purposes, and the donor-advised fund exercises ex-
penditure responsibility with respect to the distribution. 51 Ex-
penditure responsibility means that the grantor must establish
procedures and make reasonable efforts (1) to ensure that the
grant is spent only for the purpose for which it is made, (2) to ob-
tain reports from the grantee on how the funds are spent, and (3)
to make detailed reports on the expenditures to the IRS. 59 Re-
quiring expenditure responsibility when distributions are made
for charitable purposes to organizations that are not public chari-
ties seems a reasonable requirement and has not provoked any
protest from the not-for-profit community.
A second set of provisions subjects donor-advised funds to the
excess benefit rules applicable to charities and social welfare or-
ganizations other than private foundations. Under these rules, if
a donor-advised fund confers any economic benefit on a donor or
donor advisor, or a person related to either of them, the transac-
tion will be tested to see if any excess benefit was conferred on
them. 6 ° There will be an excess benefit if the value of the benefit
conferred exceeds the value of the consideration provided for it.'
If, for example, a donor-advised fund were to sell to a donor stock
worth $200,000 for $100,000, there would be an excess benefit of
$100,000.
ment of Putnam Scholarship Fund).
156. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
157. I.R.C. § 4966(c)(2) (referring to organizations listed in I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)).
158. Id. § 4966(c)(1)(B).
159. Id. § 4945(h).
160. Id. § 4958(c). This provision applies to transactions properly viewed as being with
the donor-advised fund, not with the sponsoring organization. See J. COMM. ON TAXATION,
JCX-38-06, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 4, THE "PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006,"
AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE ON JULY 28, 2006, AND AS CONSIDERED BY THE SENATE ON
AUGUST 3,2006 347-48 (2006).
161. I.R.C. § 4958 (c)(1)(A).
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An initial tax of twenty-five percent of the excess benefit is im-
posed on the person to whom the excess benefit was conferred,
and an initial tax of ten percent is imposed on any organization
manager who knowingly and willfully participated in conferring
the benefit.1 62 If the initial tax is imposed and the excess benefit is
not corrected within the taxable period, an additional tax of two
hundred percent of the excess benefit is imposed on the person to
whom the benefit was conferred. 163 This aspect of the application
of the excess benefit rules to donor-advised funds is unobjectiona-
ble; it simply applies to donor-advised funds the rules applicable
to public charities.6 4
Quite another matter are the rules applicable when the trans-
action involves a grant, loan, payment of compensation, or any
similar transaction, including expense reimbursement. 16 In these
cases the entire amount is considered an excess benefit, even if
there is no excess.166 Thus, for example, if a donor-advised fund
pays a donor who is a lawyer $25,000 for services whose fair mar-
ket value is $35,000, the entire $25,000 will be subject to the
excise tax. Similarly, if a donor-advised fund reimburses a donor
for expenses incurred in organizing a fund-raising event, the en-
tire amount of the reimbursement will be considered an excess
benefit. The rule is harsher than the self-dealing rules applicable
to private foundations, which permit reasonable compensation
and reimbursement of disqualified persons.' 67 It amounts to an
absolute prohibition against all grants, loans, compensation, and
similar transactions between donor-advised funds and donors,
donor advisors, and persons related to them.
It is difficult to see any reason for prohibiting donor-advised
funds from paying donors market rates for services performed or
reimbursing them for expenses incurred when private founda-
tions are permitted to do so. It is certainly no easier for a donor to
manipulate a donor-advised fund than it is for the creator of a
private foundation to manipulate the foundation. Yet Congress
has not chosen to prohibit the payment of reasonable salaries to
162. Id. § 4958(a).
163. Id. § 4958(b).
164. Id. § 4958(c)(2).
165. See id.; J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 160, at 347 (stating that expense reim-
bursements are similar transactions).
166. I.R.C. § 4958(c)(2)(B).
167. Id. § 4941(d)(2)(E).
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those who perform services for private foundations or to prohibit
reimbursing them for expenses incurred on behalf of the founda-
tion.168
The prohibitions are far from costless. Donors may be particu-
larly well positioned to provide services to the funds they created
but unable or unwilling to provide them gratis. The legislation
prohibits them from receiving any compensation for their servic-
es, even at discounted rates. The prohibition against reimbursing
legitimate expenses of donors may well discourage donors from
running fund-raisers for donor-advised funds they have created. 169
A few cases of abuse referred to in congressional hearings are
hardly a sufficient basis for believing that such measures are ne-
cessary.
A third rule imposes an excise tax on donors, donor advisors,
and persons related to them, who advise a sponsoring organiza-
tion to make a distribution from a donor-advised fund that re-
sults, directly or indirectly, in more than incidental benefit to a
donor, a donor advisor, or a person related to them. 70 The tax is
125% of the benefit received.171 A ten percent excise tax of no more
than $10,000 is also imposed on any fund manager who knowing-
ly agrees to the distribution.172 Thus, for example, if a donor ad-
vises a donor-advised fund to contribute $1,000,000 to a universi-
ty and the university sends the donor football tickets worth
$1,000, the donor would potentially be subject to a tax of $1,250 if
the IRS chose to consider the tickets a more than incidental bene-
fit.173
168. See I.R.C. § 4941.
169. See Hearings on Tax-Exempt Charitable Organizations, supra note 155, at 178
(statement of Karen Krei, Piedmont Community Foundation). A man who lost his wife to
breast cancer established a donor-advised fund using his own name to make contributions
to the fight against cancer. Id. at 178. The man, who was well-connected and a good sa-
lesman, ran a fundraiser every year. Id. In this way, he was able to raise significant funds,
but under the new rules, if he wishes to continue the fundraiser, he will have to bear all of
the expenses personally. Id.
170. I.R.C. § 4967(a)(1). Neither this tax nor the tax on managers will be imposed if
excess benefit tax has been imposed with respect to the distribution. Id. § 4967(b).
171. Id. § 4967(a)(1).
172. Id. 88 4967(a)(2), (c)(2). A benefit is more than incidental if it would reduce the
amount of the charitable contribution deduction if it were received in connection with a
charitable contribution. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 160, at 350.
173. It is not clear whether a distribution by a donor-advised fund to fulfill a donor's
pledge to a charity indirectly confers a benefit on the donor. The Treasury is expected to
issue guidance on this issue.
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This rule is in some ways reminiscent of the rules that deny a
charitable contribution deduction under I.R.C. section 170 for
contributions (whether to a public charity or to a private founda-
tion), which produce a more than incidental benefit to a private
individual.174 The rule, however, is much harsher. Where it ap-
plies, the donor is not deprived of a deduction (which is never
worth more to the taxpayer than the highest marginal rate of
tax), but rather, is subject to a penalty equal to 125% of the value
of the benefit received. 175 This rule has no equivalent in the pri-
vate foundation area, where the same sort of abuses that the rule
is intended to prevent could occur at least as easily as in the do-
nor-advised fund context. 176 Nothing in the legislative history of
the Pension Protection Act of 2006 justifies this rule, nor does
there seem to be any logical reason for subjecting donor-advised
funds to rules that do not apply to private foundations.177 The rule
also has the disadvantage of being extremely difficult to enforce.
In the example given above, only an extraordinarily diligent and
lucky auditor could connect an individual's receipt of football
tickets from a university with the university's receipt of a contri-
bution from a donor-advised fund to which the recipient of the
tickets had contributed money (perhaps years earlier). Congress
seems to have decided to clamp down on potential abuses without
any clear basis for thinking that draconian measures were needed
and without any consideration of the measures' effects on legiti-
mate transactions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The problem with the Pension Protection Act of 2006 provisions
regarding donor-advised funds is not that they are clearly ill-
conceived. It is at least possible that they may be appropriate
responses to widespread abuses that cannot be remedied in ways
that impose fewer costs on legitimate operations. But they may
equally well be an overreaction to isolated reports of abuse that
unnecessarily impose significant costs on the nonprofit sector and
divert badly needed charitable funds into compliance. There
174. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(C).
175. Id. § 4967(a)(1).
176. See id. §§ 4940-4948.
177. Tax-Exempt Charitable Organizations, supra note 154, at 130 (statement of the
American Bar Association Section of Taxation).
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simply is no way of knowing. Congress lacked even the most ele-
mentary factual basis for its decisions, and supporters and critics
of the legislation today are equally bereft of solid factual founda-
tions for their opinions. "8 The IRS cannot provide the necessary
information because it has almost no reliable data about donor-
advised funds.Y9
The IRS's lack of information about donor-advised funds, al-
though lamentable, is hardly surprising. At one level, it is the re-
sult of inadequate funding. The excise taxes which Congress im-
posed on private foundations in 1969 were supposed to have been
used to fund IRS oversight of exempt organizations, but that nev-
er happened.' 8° In the absence of special appropriations for over-
sight of exempt organizations, this function suffered dispropor-
tionately from cuts in the overall budget of the IRS. Faced with a
shrinking budget, the IRS understandably emphasized areas that
directly produce tax revenue rather than areas like exempt or-
ganizations which are primarily regulatory.'"" As a former Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue testified:
The Commissioner generally has a rule that he won't ask for a dollar
unless he can bring in large multiples of that .... [A]s you cut the
Commissioner's budget and personnel... you find that.., the first
thing that is cut is ... compliance, because that is the only optional
money he has. He has to produce returns. He has to process returns.
He has to collect money. There are a number of functions that he has
to do, and so he has no leeway there. He can audit more returns or
less returns. He can audit the returns more intensively or less inten-
sively.' 2
Since 1974 the number of charitable organizations has more
than doubled, but the staff of the IRS's Tax Exempt and Govern-
ment Entities Division has grown by only three percent. 8 3 Be-
tween 1995 and 2005, the number of charities registered with the
IRS increased from 1.3 million to 1.8 million, but the IRS staff
178. See Overview of the Tax-Exempt Sector, supra note 3, at 21-22 (statement of David
M. Walker, Comptroller General, U.S. Government Accountability Office).
179. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE supra note 74, at 16-17.
180. PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 84, at 24.
181. Overview of the Tax-Exempt Sector, supra note 3, at 19 (statement of David M.
Walker, Comptroller General, U.S. Government Accountability Office).
182. Id. at 102 (statement of Sheldon S. Cohen, Former Comm'r of the Internal Reve-
nue Service).
183. PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 84, at 13.
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dedicated to exempt organizations shrank.'8 As a result, the IRS
lacks much basic information about exempt organizations. It can-
not, for example, locate a significant percentage of the exempt or-
ganizations listed in its master business file or even say if they
still exist.1 85 Until fiscal year 2003, the returns of exempt organi-
zations did not even need to indicate that they sponsored donor-
advised funds,'18 6 and information about the assets of donor-
advised funds and their payouts will be collected for the first time
for fiscal year 2008.187
The IRS lacks the financial and human resources to perform
audits and other studies needed to develop reliable information
about donor-advised funds and more generally about the exempt
sector. In 1995, the IRS audited only two percent of returns filed
by exempt organizations, and in subsequent years, things got
worse.8 8 In no year between 1996 and 2001 did it examine even
one percent of the returns.1 9 In several years it examined less
than 0.5%. 190 The number of returns audited hit a low point in
2005 when less than 5,000 audits were performed. 191 The number
increased slightly in recent years, but the 7,580 audits performed
in 2007 still represented only a miniscule percentage of the re-
turns filed. 192
Providing the IRS with more adequate funding is only a first
step toward developing well-informed legislation regarding donor-
advised funds and tax exempt organizations more generally. The
IRS is essentially a tax collection agency, and its culture reflects
that reality. An organization whose primary function is to collect
184. Ebeling, supra note 19.
185. THOMAS H. POLLAK & JONATHAN D. DURNFORD, THE SCOPE AND ACTIVITIES OF
501(C)(3) SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS 14 n.13 (2005), available at http://www.urban.org/
UploadedPDF/411175_501c3_support-orgs.pdf (noting that in 1994, the IRS could not lo-
cate twenty-one percent of the exempt organizations listed in its Business Master File).
186. See I.R.S. SCHEDULE A (FORM 990) ORGANIZATION EXEMPT UNDER SECTION
501(c)(3) OMB NO. 1545-0047, PART III (2003), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/f990sa.pdf.
187. See I.R.S., supra note 137.
188. Ebeling, supra note 19.
189. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-526, TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS:
IMPROVEMENTS POSSIBLE IN PUBLIC, IRS, AND STATE OVERSIGHT OF CHARITIES 22 (2002).
190. Id.
191. I.R.S., FISCAL YEAR 2007 IRS ENFORCEMENT AND SERVICES STATISTICS 9 (2007),
available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/O,,id=177701,0O.html (follow "FY 2007
IRS Enforcement and Services Tables" hyperlink).
192. See id.
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taxes is not likely to dedicate its best financial or human re-
sources to tasks unrelated to raising revenue. In explaining the
IRS's lack of focus on the tax exempt sector, former Commissioner
Cohen quoted the famous response of bank robber Willie Sutton
to the question why he robbed banks: "That is where the money
is.193 An agency whose primary mission is to collect taxes is in-
evitably drawn to focusing on those activities that directly pro-
duce revenue.
There is much to be said for eventually transferring a large
part of the functions currently carried out by the IRS in the ex-
empt arena to the state attorneys general and to a federal agency
specifically charged with overseeing the exempt sector. 194 To craft
such legislation intelligently, however, Congress needs a much
clearer, more detailed, and more accurate picture than it current-
ly has of the sector. To avoid legislating in the dark as it did in
the Pension Protection Act's donor-advised fund provisions, Con-
gress needs to provide the IRS the necessary resources, direct it
to use them to develop the required information, and have the pa-
tience to wait for the results. Otherwise it will continue to re-
spond in knee-jerk fashion to isolated reports of abuses, enacting
measures that may be beneficial, but may equally well do more
harm than good.
193. Overview of the Tax-Exempt Sector, supra note 3, at 70 (statement of Sheldon S.
Cohen, former Comm'r of the Internal Revenue Service).
194. See, e.g., Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Is It Time to Treat Private Foundations and
Public Charities Alike?, 52 ExEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 257 (2006); Robert M. Lang, Jr., Phi-
lanthropy Needs Its Own Federal Agency, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Apr. 28, 2005, at 41;
John C. McGee, Letter to the Editor How Lawmakers Can Best Help Nonprofit Groups,
CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 4, 2005, at 51.
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